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Abstract
Background: The completeness of preferences is assumed as one of the axioms of expected
utility theory but has been subject to little empirical study.
Methods: Fifteen non-health professionals was recruited and familiarised with the standard gamble
technique. The group then met five times over six months and preferences were elicited
independently on 41 scenarios. After individual valuation, the group discussed the scenarios,
following which preferences could be changed. Changes made were described and summary
measures (mean and median) before and after discussion compared using paired t test and
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. Semi-structured telephone interviews were carried out to explore
attitudes to discussing preferences. These were transcribed, read by two investigators and
emergent themes described.
Results: Sixteen changes (3.6%) were made to preferences by seven (47%) of the fifteen members.
The difference between individual preference values before and after discussion ranged from -0.025
to 0.45. The average effect on the group mean was 0.0053. No differences before and after
discussion were statistically significant. The group valued discussion highly and suggested it brought
four main benefits: reassurance; improved procedural performance; increased group cohesion;
satisfying curiosity.
Conclusion: The hypothesis that preferences are incomplete cannot be rejected for a proportion
of respondents. However, brief discussion did not result in substantial number of changes to
preferences and these did not have significant impact on summary values for the group, suggesting
that incompleteness, if present, may not have an important effect on cost-utility analyses.
Background
Cost-utility analysis is regarded as an important element
in the formation of policy on the use of health technolo-
gies. Guidelines suggest that a community perspective
should be taken in estimating utility weights to apply to
health states in decision analytic modelling [1,2]. Multi-
attribute utility scales for which population weights are
available provide the basis for one approach to obtaining
such values [3-6]. We are investigating another: the estab-
lishment of a standing group of non-health professionals
who value health states, described in short vignettes, as
required by analysts. The first phase of this project was car-
ried out with a small group of people who met in person
to carry out health state preference valuation. This pro-
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vided an opportunity to investigate the impact of sharing
initial preference values and allowing group discussion of
the scenarios. This issue is important for several reasons
and has been subject to little empirical study.
Choice theory [7] is based on several axioms, amongst
which is that an individual's preferences regarding any
bundle of goods are complete i.e. that the process of elic-
itation merely reveals preferences and does not, of itself,
influence the preferences [8]. Under such an assumption,
variation in preferences measured at different times is
only a function of measurement error. While the axiom of
completeness may not be important for the validity of
microeconomic theory [9], a different situation may per-
tain where the goods of interest are health related [10].
Evidence for lack of completeness could be counted as evi-
dence against the theory's validity. Fischhoff has suggested
that preferences are not complete but are developed and
clarified by trial and error i.e. that the process of elicitation
is an integral part of a process of preference development,
rather than a neutral method by which an already com-
plete preference is measured [10].
Empirical evidence for incompleteness has been reviewed
by Ryan and San Miguel [11]. Preference reversal in
response to minor framing effects in the presentation of
preference elicitation experiments suggests that the elicita-
tion procedure may play an important role in forming
responses [12-15]. In the literature examining willingness
to pay, environmental economists have noted, using a
range of terms, people who do not have formed prefer-
ences [16].
The practical importance of the completeness axiom, as
pointed out by Shiell et al [17], lies in its implications for
the accuracy of efforts to measure strength of preference.
If preferences are not complete, and develop during and
beyond the process of elicitation, then the apparent vari-
ance in values from a group of individuals will underesti-
mate the true variation in values. This has potentially
important implications for the use of preference data e.g.
in decision analytic models as utility weights to calculate
cost per QALY. If preferences are incomplete, then use of
such values without some form of correction will under-
estimate parameter uncertainty in the model, and may
(though not invariably [18]) have important impacts on
policy decisions.
To our knowledge, the impact of group discussion imme-
diately after individual and independent elicitation of
preferences has not previously been studied. We therefore
tested the hypotheses that facilitated discussion in a small
group would result in (a) no changes by individuals and
(b) no significant changes in the summary utilities from
the group.
Methods
The group was recruited from Non-Executive Directors of
local healthcare organisations (Primary Care Trusts), con-
tact with the local voluntary sector and by advertisement
in a local newspaper. Non-Executive Directors are mem-
bers of the Boards of local (NHS) healthcare organisa-
tions. Part of their role in that capacity was to bring a lay
perspective to the business of the organisation. The mean
age of participants was 64 years (range 51 to 80 years, SD
7 years). Table 1 shows other summary characteristics of
the group.
Participants were familiarised with the standard gamble
technique in one to one training sessions, lasting around
an hour, with a refresher session at the beginning of each
group meeting. The group met five times over six months,
with each meeting lasting about three hours. Meetings
began with a reminder of the standard gamble task and
presentation of the scenarios that were to be valued. It was
Table 1: Panel characteristics
Panel Characteristics N (%)
Sex Male 9 (60)
Female 5 (40)
Marital status Married 13 (87)
Widowed 2 (13)
Occupation Retired 8 (53)
Working part-time 7 (47)
Level of educational attainment Higher degree (MSc, PhD etc.) 7 (47)
First Degree (BSc etc.) 2 (13)
NVQ Level 4–5, HNC, HND 2 (13)
2 or more A' Levels 2 (13)
Other qualifications 1 (7)
Data missing 1 (7)
Ethnicity White 15 (100)Health and Quality of Life Outcomes 2006, 4:22 http://www.hqlo.com/content/4/1/22
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emphasised to participants that it was not intended that
the group reach a consensus and there was no obligation
to take the views of others into account in considering
each scenario after discussion.
41 health state scenarios were developed by one of us
(KS). 35 described different severities of six conditions,
which were developed from disease specific outcome
measures, and six were derived from the EQ5D – a generic
preference based measure of health status. Scenarios were
presented to participants in "table" format [20] and were
not labelled with the name of the condition being
described. The conditions depicted during the study were
multiple sclerosis, Gaucher's disease, osteoarthritis of the
hip, Crohn's disease, eczema, and heart failure i.e. a mix
of common and rare conditions. The standard gamble
procedure was carried out using a top-down titration
search procedure, recorded using a paper form. Individu-
als carried out this initial preference measurement task
independently i.e. no discussion or sharing of responses
was permitted. When all participants had completed the
task, the preferences elicited were fed back to the group
and a short period of discussion followed. In this, partici-
pants were invited to comment on the scenario and the
reasons for their responses in the standard gamble task.
No time limits were set on the discussion, although the
facilitator (KS) intervened when it appeared the discus-
sion had left the subject or no further comments were
forthcoming. Participants were then given the opportu-
nity to revise their responses in the standard gamble
response sheet.
We noted the number of times preference values were
changed, the values before and after discussion and the
impact changes had on the range and summary measures
(mean and median) from the group. Utility values before
and after discussion were compared using paired t-test
and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. Possible associations
between personal characteristics and likelihood of mak-
ing changes to initial utility values were investigated using
X2 and t-tests as appropriate.
After the five meetings were complete, we carried out
semi-structured telephone interviews with each of the par-
ticipants. We asked participants "What do you think of the
discussion time after each scenario?"; "Do you feel that
you have sufficient discussion time?" "How helpful is the
discussion and why?". Interviews were recorded and tran-
scripts read and re-read by two of us (KS and TC). Emer-
gent themes were identified independently and then
compared and discussed, according to the principles of
grounded theory, although we did not carry out concur-
rent analysis and data collection [21]. Nevertheless, a list
of themes, constituting a preliminary analytical frame-
work arising from the data is described.
Results
441 responses to the 41 scenarios were collected from the
group. Table 3 shows the number of changes made and
differences in preferences following discussion. At least
one change was made in each meeting of the panel. Six-
teen changes in responses were made (3.6%) to fourteen
scenarios. One individual changed five responses, out of a
total of 26 responses by this participant made during the
study (19%). One participant made three changes (9% of
their total responses) and three made two changes (8.0%,
7% and 5% respectively of their total responses in the
study). The remaining two participants made only one
change (6% and 3% of total responses). The difference
between individual preferences before and after discus-
sion ranged from -0.025 to 0.45. Two thirds of the
changes were positive. The average change to an individ-
ual's response was 0.042.
Changes in utility affected the group's range of responses
to a scenarios in only four instances. The impact on sum-
mary values was limited. The median for the group
changed in only four cases (range of differences in medi-
ans -0.05 to 0.03). The group mean was very slightly
affected in all cases (range -0.01 to 0.08) but in only one
case was the difference before and after discussion greater
than 0.01. The average effect of discussion on the group
mean was an increase in utility of 0.0053. No differences
before and after discussion were statistically significant.
Table 2: Individual changes made to preferences after discussion
Panel Member N scenarios considered N (%)changes made Differences (after – before 
discussion)
A 25 2 (8.0) -0.125, 0.05
B 30 2 (6.7) 0.05, 0.025
C 41 2 (4.9) 0.45, -0.075
D 16 1 (6.3) 0.2
E 35 3 (8.6) -0.025, 0.1, 0.05
F 34 1 (2.9) -0.05
G 26 5 (19.2) -0.025, 0.075, 0.025, -0.1, 0.05Health and Quality of Life Outcomes 2006, 4:22 http://www.hqlo.com/content/4/1/22
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Personal characteristics of participants were not associ-
ated with the likelihood of making changes to initial util-
ity values.
The qualitative element of the study showed the group
were unanimous in finding discussion helpful. Group
members recognised that few changes were made in
response to the discussion, but nevertheless valued this
part of the process highly. We identified four themes in
their responses.
1. Reassurance about personal preferences
The discussion period provided an opportunity to reflect
on initial preferences and provided reassurance about the
individual's initial response.
"But it can help you to reinforce or indeed it can clarify areas
of doubt which you may have had"
"Because depending on the view of the panel members, ... I
think it reassures people, it reinforces the basic ideas"
2. Procedural performance
The discussion allowed the group to reflect on the proc-
esses undertaken and to ensure that they maintained the
appropriate assumptions regarding, particularly, perspec-
tive and health state duration and consistency. This was
not only perceived as an opportunity for the group to
«correct» aberrant responses revealed during discussion,
but the knowledge that the discussion would take place
appeared to concentrate the minds of respondents on the
task in case they were found by the group to have carried
out the procedure «wrongly».
"When you don't discuss things you could get people putting in
things... because they are not having to justify or talk about it
... I think the really important thing is actually discussing it and
having to justify what you've written"
"Sometimes those people who are a bit off line – like we occa-
sionally get somebody who says, 'oh I was thinking about that
from another point of view' then we all chime in and say, 'ah,
but you're not supposed to do that'. And somebody on their own
could easily get off key a bit without anybody realising it"
3. Increase group cohesion
The group reported enjoying the meetings. The discussion
period after initial preference elicitation was seen as an
important part of the group's interactions which, in turn,
was a reason for maintaining attendance.
"It makes people relax, it's good for people to talk. It makes eve-
rybody more of a group"
"It's feeling part of a team and the feeling that you are achiev-
ing something important"
4. Satisfy curiosity about how others come to their 
decisions
The group were clearly interested in each others' perspec-
tive on the health state and valued the discussion as a
means of satiating curiosity about how and why people
reached their preference.
"What I enjoy is seeing where other people are coming from and
noticing how their personal agenda comes into it"
"I think it's nice to hear what people, why people made their
decisions"
Discussion
We found that a brief period of discussion of the scenarios
and initial preference values resulted in few changes to
Table 3: Summary preference values before and after discussion
Before discussion After discussion Difference
Health state Description Mean (SD) Median (range) Mean (SD) Median (range) Mean (SD) Median
1. Multiple sclerosis state 1 0.75 (0.21) 0.85 (0.48–1.0) 0.83 (0.16) 0.88 (0.48–1.0) 0.08 (-0.01) 0.03
2. Multiple sclerosis state 2 0.94 (0.06) 0.98 (0.85–1.0) 0.93 (0.05) 0.93 (0.85–1.0) -0.01 (-0.05) -0.05
3. Gaucher's disease 0.88 (0.14) 0.93 (0.5–1.0) 0.88 (0.14) 0.93 (0.5–1.0) 0 (0) 0
4. EQ5D state 1 0.97 (0.03) 0.98 (0.9–1.0) 0.98 (0.02) 0.98 (0.93–1.0) 0.01 (-0.01) 0
5. EQ5D state 2 0.3 (0.51) 0.48 (-0.88–0.88) 0.30 (0.51) 0.48 (-0.88–0.88) 0 (0) 0
6. EQ5D state 3 0.75 (0.19) 0.83 (0.38–0.98) 0.75 (0.20) 0.83 (0.38–0.98) 0 (0.01) 0
7. Heart failure state 1 0.84 (0.26) 0.93 (0.05–0.98) 0.84 (0.26) 0.93 (0.05–0.98) 0 (0) 0
8. Heart failure state 2 0.51 (0.42) 0.56 (-0.68–0.93) 0.50 (0.41) 0.56 (-0.68–0.93) -0.01 (-0.01) 0
9. Moderate eczema 0.782 (0.22) 0.88 (0.28–1.0) 0.786 (0.22) 0.88 (0.28–1.0) 0.004 (0) 0
10. Severe eczema 0.70 (0.23) 0.68 (0.3–1.0) 0.69 (0.21) 0.68 (0.3–0.95) -0.01 (-0.02) 0
11. Osteoarthritis state 1 0.96 (0.06) 1.00 (0.83–1.0) 0.96 (0.06) 0.98 (0.83–1.0) 0 (0) -0.02
12. Osteoarthritis state 2 0.83 (0.13) 0.83 (0.58–1.0) 0.83 (0.11) 0.83 (0.68–1.0) 0 (-0.02) 0
13. Osteoarthritis state 3 0.96 (0.04) 0.98 (0.88–1.0) 0.97 (0.03) 0.98 (0.93–1.0) 0.01 (-0.01) 0
14. Osteoarthritis state 4 0.98 (0.02) 0.98 (0.93–1.0) 0.98 (0.02) 0.99 (0.93–1.0) 0 (0) 0.01 (0)Health and Quality of Life Outcomes 2006, 4:22 http://www.hqlo.com/content/4/1/22
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values, although a substantial proportion of the group
(40%) made at least one change during the course of the
study. Importantly, the impact of changes made at the
group level, even in this small group, was negligible.
Despite this, members of the group rated the discussion
period as very important, for four main reasons: providing
reassurance about initial preferences, checking procedural
performance, increasing group cohesion and satisfying
curiosity. We were interested in the impact of discussion
and group cohesion. We hypothesised that, if discussion
was important to people in formulating their preferences,
then the physical meeting of the group may be a valuable
feature. Our findings suggest that discussion may be
important to maintaining interest in the group and adher-
ence to the task.
Our study has a number of strengths and weaknesses.
Utility estimation is generally undertaken as a solitary
exercise, regardless of the method of data collection (face
to face, telephone, postal or internet). We are not aware of
any other studies which have investigated eliciting prefer-
ences individually in a group setting and explored the
impact of sharing information and attitudes. Although the
group was very small, 41 scenarios were valued and over
400 preference estimates were subject to potential change
as a result of discussion. Nevertheless, statistical power
was low in the individual comparisons and the possibility
of a type II error in these analyses remains relatively high.
For example, in the case of the largest difference in means
before and after discussion (0.08), power was no more
than 0.56. Despite this, the size of differences are such that
we think it unlikely that they would have important
impacts on cost-utility analyses. This hypothesis cannot
be explored, however, without further research in the con-
text of real decision problems.
A further limitation is the relative homogeneity of the par-
ticipants. All were white and relatively well educated and
therefore do not represent the population at large. There
is therefore a case for further research into the impact of
discussion, and additional information, in a more diverse
population.
We are not aware of any studies which have examined the
effect of discussion on preferences elicited in a group set-
ting. Dolan et al studied the impact of discussion in a
focus group setting [19] but this examined theoretical
health care purchasing decisions and not preferences on
health states. An effect of discussion was shown but the
choices made by participants were subject to a wide range
of considerations which do not enter into preference elic-
itation in the context examined here.
Evidence regarding the completeness of preferences
comes from only a few studies.
Several authors have examined the reliability of prefer-
ence elicitation techniques and this provides some indica-
tion of the stability of preferences over time. However, it
is not possible to state whether evidence of poor reliability
is a function of the nature of the measurement tool or as
a result of the formation of preferences over time. Feeny et
al described the test-retest reliability of the standard gam-
ble in a sample of people with hip osteoarthritis who
rated their own health and three marker states up to four
times [22]. Test-retest reliability coefficients were moder-
ate and ranged from 0.49 to 0.62. There was no evidence
of an effect of time between ratings.
Shiell et al, in a study of repeated preference elicitation on
two health states in 42 people showed that, for most of
the sample, preferences were stable over repeated testing,
suggesting completeness [17]. However, one-third of the
group changed their responses and suggested that the
interview process had prompted them to think about their
values more deeply. We found a similar proportion of
people changed their responses, although the frequency
of changes was low. Like Shiell et al, the impact on sum-
mary measures was limited.
There are some important methodological differences
between our study and this study by Shiell et al repeated
elicitation after 7 weeks to reduce the impact of recall on
subsequent testing. They reported that a significant
number of people reported events happening in the
interim which affected their values, although their results
were not substantially affected by the exclusion of this
group. It is not a requirement of expected utility theory
that preferences are stable throughout life. We allowed
reflection immediately after elicitation and therefore the
impact of intervening events was removed.
Shiell et al and, in a commentary on this paper, Oliver
[23] highlight the potential role of familiarity with the
elicitation procedure as contributing to variability in util-
ity values. This was unlikely to be important in our study
as the group were familiar with procedures prior to collec-
tion of the data presented here, although it is possible that
learning effects persisted into the study period.
The scenarios used by Shiell et al were presented in narra-
tive form and were written in the third person. Preferences
were therefore expressed in relation to the subject of the
scenario and not the respondent. This introduces an addi-
tional source of variability in preferences since respond-
ents had to consider, in particular the social consequences
(handicap) of the health state for a third party. In contrast,
we emphasised to participants that they should consider
the possible impacts of the health states in the context of
their own lives.Health and Quality of Life Outcomes 2006, 4:22 http://www.hqlo.com/content/4/1/22
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Shiell et al, in a further study, examined the test-retest reli-
ability of standard gamble and time trade off techniques
across three measurement occasions in a five week period
in 92 people recruited from the Australian general public.
At the individual level, there was some evidence that vari-
ation in responses fell after repeated administration of the
task, suggesting that «participants came to recognise the
value that they would ascribe to a health state as a result
of participating in the study». The generalisability coeffi-
cient (corresponding to test-retest reliability) was 0.55,
indicating reasonable reliability. There were, however, a
small number of people whose values showed marked
variation across the measurement period. Shiell et al
found, as did we, that variation in individual measure-
ment had no important effects on the group summary
preference values. In this study, Shiell et al also tested the
effect of encouraging reflection on values between meas-
urements by allocating some participants to receive a
booklet after the first interview which explained the
nature and rationale behind the study and the questions
asked and described what the participant's responses
implied about the value of the state they had considered.
Participants were asked to review their previous responses
prior to subsequent interviews and consider whether the
answers expressed previously still reflected their values in
relation to the health state. There was no evidence for an
effect from this intervention.
Ryan and San Miguel extended the work of Shiell et al by
examining completeness in the context of a contingent
valuation experiment [11]. They addressed the hypothesis
that respondents are more likely to form preferences
through elicitation where the goods being valued are less
familiar by examining preferences for a supermarket, a
dentist practice and a bowel cancer screening test. They
investigated stabililty of preferences by carrying out the
valuation task on three occasions, each separated by three
weeks. Ryan and San Miguel found little evidence of
incompleteness. Contrary to the hypothesis, preferences
for the bowel cancer screening test appeared, if anything,
to be more complete than those for the other bundles of
goods. Furthermore, preferences appeared stable within
and between interviews, suggesting that there was «very
little evidence of the construction of preferences».
By using contingent valuation as the framework for their
study, Ryan and San Miguel avoided some of the difficul-
ties in carrying out preference elicitation using the stand-
ard gamble. Their results suggest that, in over two thirds of
cases, there is evidence for the completeness of prefer-
ences. However, in one third, there was, at least, some
uncertainty over completeness. In this respect, there is
remarkable similarity between the results of the three
approaches taken by Shiell et al, Ryan and San Miguel and
ourselves.
There are several possible interpretations of our results.
They may be taken as weak evidence supporting the com-
pleteness of preferences. We suggest the evidence is weak,
because other interpretations are possible and it is not
possible to reject the hypothesis that preferences are
incomplete. Firstly, preferences may be incomplete but
members of the group did not change their values because
of social desirability bias i.e. they perceived that changing
values was not valued by the group, and since the rest of
the group were aware that a member changed values
(though not the actual change made), this would be
avoided. However, we have no evidence to support the
presence of such a bias. The research team recall no discus-
sion or behaviours which suggest that changes were con-
sidered inappropriate by the group and we took care to
ensure that sufficient time was available during each ses-
sion for changes to be made.
The second possible explanation of our results lies in the
nature of the discussion. Although a detailed thematic
analysis was not carried out, our general impression was
that participants discussed their personal attitude to the
scenarios and presented little new information to the rest
of the group. That is, they described their attitude to dif-
ferent elements of the scenario e.g. pain versus mobility
problems, or they described the impact that a condition
would have on their ability to carry out activities of per-
sonal importance e.g. writing or skiing. Participants did
not, for example, attempt to name the condition depicted
in the scenarios – such labelling might have been expected
to result in a change in values [24]. In other words, the
limited influence on discussion may have been due to the
type of information shared. The third possibility is that
the amount of information was insufficient to influence
values. However, we are confident that the discussion
period, which in all cases was open-ended, reached satu-
ration as we allowed it to continue until it ended or the
group had left the subject of the scenario completely.
Finally, the discussion took place immediately after the
initial preference elicitation task. It is possible that a
longer time of reflection may be required in order for a
change in preferences to become apparent, although the
other studies in this area suggest this is not the case for
most respondents.
Although different methods have been used, there is
important consistency between our study and those by
Shiell et al, Ryan and San Miguel. In the majority of cases,
there appears to be limited evidence for the development
of preferences through the elicitation process and by refer-
ence to limited additional information or reflection. This
appears to hold when using different methods of prefer-
ence elicitation and in relation to a wide range of scenar-
ios. Moreover, the impact of variation in preferences,
which may be due to incompleteness, as well as measure-Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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ment error, appears to be limited when considering the
summary measures of utility arising from a group of indi-
viduals.
Conclusion
Relatively little research has been carried out into the com-
pleteness of preferences regarding health states. Our
study, and other important efforts in this area, suggest
that, for a minority of people, preferences may develop
during elicitation. It is not surprising that there should be
some fundamental variation in this respect, given the
apparent differences between people in such psychologi-
cal traits as extroversion and introversion. Further work is
required to explore what determines the stability or other-
wise in preferences and it will be challenging to under-
stand the influences which may arise from characteristics
of study participants, the scenarios being considered and
elicitation processes. Nevertheless, our study found little
evidence that preferences are altered by reflection and dis-
cussion immediately after elicitation in the majority of
people and, more importantly, the assumption of com-
pleteness is not unsafe from the perspective of analysts
using the summary values obtained from a group.
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